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Tribal Sell-Government and the Indian Reorganization 
Act of 1934 
The Indian Reorganization (Wheeler-Howard) Act of 19341 (IRA) 
was, by all accounts, one of the most significant single pieces of legisla-
tion directly affecting Indians ever enacted by the Congress of the 
United States. It has been "equalled in scope and significance only 
by the legislation of June 30, 1834, and the General Allotment Act of 
February 8, 1887."2 A major reversal of governmental policy and 
approach toward Indian affairs was effectuated by the IRA. This 
Comment will be concerned with the IRA as it affected the concept 
of tribal self-government, and primarily with those sections providing 
for adoption of tribal constitutions and organization as chartered 
business corporations. It will trace the development of tribal self-
government through 1934, delve into the Act itself and the objectives 
behind it, consider whether those objectives have been realized, and 
suggest a possible role for the IRA and its theory in the future. 
I. INTRODUCTION: A BACKGROUND SKETCH 
The right of tribal self-government is probably the most basic 
concept in all of Indian law. It has been consistently protected by the 
federal courts. 8 Indeed, the courts have played such a large role in 
asserting and reaffirming this principle that, although the right is an 
inherent part of original sovereignty, the doctrine itself may be said 
to be judicial. The principle, broadly stated, is that the tribes are 
"qualified to exercise powers of self-government, not by virtue of 
any delegation of powers from the Federal Government, but rather by 
reason of their original tribal sovereignty. "4 While these inherent 
powers have been greatly reduced over the years by Congress in the 
exercise of its power over "commerce ... with the Indian Tribes"5 
and by the executive branch through treaty-making, it remains true, 
I. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984, as amended, at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 
(1970). 
2. F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 84 (Univ. New Mexico ed. undated). 
On June 30, 1834, Congress passed two acts. One was the last in a series of acts "to 
regulate trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes," ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729, which set 
the pattern for Indian-government relationships for the next century. The second 
created the Department of Indian Affairs, ch. 162, 4 Stat. 735, originally under the 
War Department, transferred to the Interior Department upon its establishment in 
1849, Act of March 3, 1849, ch. 108, § 9, 9 Stat. 395 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1451 (1970)). 
For a discussion of the General Allotment Act, see notes 28-36 infra and accompany-
ing text. 
3. See, e.g., Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1958); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 
(1896); Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 
1959). 
4. F. COHEN, supra note 2, at 122. 
5. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8. 
[955] 
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nonetheless, that one looks to the statutes and treaties to discover 
limitations on, not sources of, tribal power. 
The first comprehensive judicial expression of this doctrine is 
found in John Marshall's opinion in the famous case of Worcester v. 
Georgia.6 The State of Georgia had for years been doing its best to 
destroy the Cherokee Nation. It imprisoned a white man living with 
tribal consent among the Cherokee for violating a state law that 
required such persons to acquire a permit from the governor.7 The 
Supreme Court found this law unconstitutional, holding that the 
State could not infringe upon the federal power over Indians. The 
tribes were entitled to exercise their own self-government, to the 
exclusion of state law, subject only to federal power. Resting his 
analysis largely on principles of international law, the Chief Justice 
further recognized that the tribes "had always been considered as 
distinct, independent, political communities,"8 and that "the settled 
doctrine of the law of nations is, that a weaker power does not sur-
render its independence-its right to self-government, by associating 
with a stronger, and taking its protection."9 
While this doctrine of tribal self-government has been recognized 
and applied by the federal courts,10 it has not been so highly respected 
by administrative officials.11 For more than a century federal admin-
istrators failed to recognize the doctrine's implications. This failure 
was not entirely a result of administrative malevolence, but in large 
part was due to ignorance of the law, bureaucratic ineptness, and 
the general confusion of the American frontier.12 In addition to ad-
ministrative confusion the nineteenth century witnessed the enact-
ment of many federal statutes that had the effect of seriously diminish-
ing the area within which tribal powers could be exercised. The 
matters taken from the control of the tribes were those which, in the 
6. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
7. Law of Dec. 22, 1830, § 7 [1830] Ga. Acts 115-16. 
8. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 558. 
9. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 560. It was of the Worcester case that President Andrew Jackson 
is reported to have said, "John Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it." 
H. GREELEY, 1 .AMERICAN CONFLICT 106 (1864) (statement attributed to President Jackson 
by Congressman George N. Briggs). In fact, the State never released the defendant, but 
left him imprisoned under the unconstitutional law. F. COHEN, supra note 2, at 123. 
While the Worcester decision was prophetic in terms of judicial doctrine, its recognition 
of tribal sovereignty was not enough to prevent the tragic Cherokee removal to the 
Oklahoma territory, the "Trail of Tears," a few years later. See, e.g., A. JosEPHY, THE 
INDIAN HERITAGE OF .AMEruCA 323-24 (Bantam ed. 1969). 
IO. See authorities cited in note 3 supra. 
11. F. COHEN, supra note 2, at 122-23. 
12. For more comprehensive treatment of this doctrine, sec F. COHEN, supra note 2, 
at 122-26; Cohen, Indian Rights and the Federal Courts, 24 MINN. L. REV. 145 (1940) 
[hereinafter Federal Courts]; Solicitor's Opinion, Powers of Indian Tribes, 55 Interior 
Dec. 14 (1934). 
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judgment of Congress, the tribes could no longer safely handle.13 
The vast majority of these enactments applied by their terms to 
only one tribe or group of tribes; thus it is difficult and inappropriate 
to generalize about their effects. There were, however, a few major 
pieces of legislation that applied broadly to all Indians. An example 
of how seriously these acts limited tribal sovereignty can be seen in 
the effects of the Major Crimes Act of 1885.14 
In the case of Ex parte Crow Dog,15 the doctrine of tribal sov-
ereignty had been applied to produce what many considered an ex-
treme result. The Supreme Court there held that the murder of one 
Sioux by another on the reservation was not within the criminal 
jurisdiction of any court of the United States, state or federal, and 
that only the tribe could punish the offense. The Court, of course, 
reached the right result in light of the doctrine of original sover-
eignty.16 Nonetheless, this result so outraged the public and the Con-
gress that in less than two years the Major Crimes Act was passed. 
Under the Act original jurisdiction was given to the federal courts 
over cases involving the crimes of murder, manslaughter, rape, assault 
·with intent to kill, arson, burglary, and larceny, when committed on 
Indian land by one Indian against another. To this list, robbery, 
incest, and assault with a deadly weapon were later added.17 Usurpa-
tion of tribal control over the conduct of its members was no doubt 
far-reaching because of the consequent authorization of intervention 
by federal officers when these crimes were committed and discovered. 
It is worth noting, however, that the mere existence of this legislation 
reaffirmed the principle of tribal sovereignty. Congressional action 
resulted from a recognition that unless a federal law was enacted the 
13. F. CoHEN, supra note 2, at 122. There are many examples, the most important 
of which are probably the enactments dealing with Indian trade (see 25 U.S.C. §§ 261-64 
(1970)) and liquor regulation (see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1154-56 (1970)). 
14. Act of March 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 385, as amended, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 
3242 (1970), upheld in United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886). 
15. 109 U.S. 556 (1883). 
16. The contention that the federal courts had jurisdiction was based not on princi-
ples applicable to tribes generally, but on the language of a treaty with the Sioux. 
Treaty with the Sioux, April 29, 1868, 15 Stat. 635. The Court found that language 
insufficient and then went on to apply the sovereignty doctrine. 109 U.S. at 567. 
17. Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 321, §§ 328-29, 35 Stat. 1151; Act of March 3, 1911, 
ch. 231, § 296, 36 Stat. 1167; and Act of June 28, 1932, ch. 284, 47 Stat. 337 (codified 
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 3242 (1970)). The crimes of carnal knowledge of a female i,mder 
sLxteen and assault with intent to rape were added in 1966. Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. 
L. No. 89-707, 80 Stat. 1101 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 3242 (1970)). In 1968 assault 
resulting in serious bodily injury was added. Act of April 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 284, 
§ 501, 82 Stat. 80 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1970)). These crimes, plus infringement 
of a few federal laws applicable to both Indians and non-Indians (see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 438, 1154-65, 1853 and 25 U.S.C. §§ 179, 202 (1970)), constitute the only acts of Indi-
ans against each other on Indian land that are federal crimes. All other such offenses 
are solely within tribal jurisdiction. 
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tribes would retain control and exclusive jurisdiction over these 
offenses. Indeed, to the extent that such power has not been taken 
from them, tribes today continue to exercise control over law and 
order on the reservation through tribal codes, tribal courts, and tribal 
police.18 
Another event that altered the attitude toward tribal self-govern-
ment was the cessation of treaty-making between the federal govern-
ment and the tribes in 1871.19 The House of Representatives had no 
effective control over Indian affairs, which rested exclusively with 
the President and the Senate under the treaty power,20 and opposition 
to this lack of power was growing.21 Attacks on treaty-making were 
also being voiced from within the administration.22 Concepts of 
assimilation and citizenship began to be pressed by those opposed to 
treaty-making, particularly those within the administration. Since the 
close of the Civil War, the House had used this opposition to insert 
progressively more restrictive wording into Indian appropriation 
acts.23 The culmination finally came in 1871 when the House managed 
to tack onto the 1872 fiscal appropriation bill the following clause: 
"Hereafter no Indian nation or tribe ... shall be acknowledged or 
recognized as an independent nation, tribe or power with whom 
the United States may contract by treaty."24 Despite this ominous 
language, tribal sovereignty in terms of powers of self-government 
continued to be recognized. Treaties were replaced by Indian "agree-
ments," which differed only in that they were ratified by both houses 
of Congress.25 In theory, these private agreements, like treaties, were 
based on Indian consent. As will be seen, this principle of mutual 
consent was reaffirmed by the IRA. Thus, while the form of dealing 
with the tribes was altered in 1871, the actual effect on tribal powers 
was probably minimal. 
There were other more serious restrictions on tribal power in the 
latter years of the nineteenth century. The decade of the 1890's saw, 
for example, the development of a policy of Indian education that 
18. See COMMISSION ON THE RIGHTS, LIBERTIES, AND REsPONSIBILlTIES OF THE .AMERICAN 
INDIAN, THE INDIAN, .AMERICA'S UNFINISHED BusINFSS 56-60 (W. Brophy &: S. Aberle ed. 
1966) [hereinafter BROPHY CoMMJSSION]. 
19. See Act of March 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 566 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 71 
(1970)). 
20. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
21. See F. WALKER, THE INDIAN QUESTION 11 (1874). 
22. See 1862 REPORT CoMMR. INDIAN .AFFAIRS 7. See generally F. COHEN, supra note 2, 
at 17-18. 
23. See, e.g., Act of March 29, 1867, ch. 13, § 6, 15 Stat. 9 (repealed by Act of July 
20, 1867, ch. 34, 15 Stat. 18). 
24. Act of March 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 566. 
25. See, e.g., Act of July 10, 1882, ch. 284, 22 Stat. 157 (Crows); Act of April 29, 1874, 
ch. 134, 18 Stat. 36 (Utes). 
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had a severe impact on tribal self-control. For example, an appropria-
tions act authorized the Secretary of Interior to withhold the furnish-
ing of subsistence or rations to any Indian family whose children did 
not attend school.26 These restrictive practices were compounded by 
the practice of encouraging the removal of Indian children from their 
parents and sending them to distant nonreservation boarding 
schools.27 Such practices resulted in severe deterioration of tribal 
unity and control over internal domestic affairs. 
Of all pre-IRA legislation, by far the most devastating was the 
General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887.28 This Act authorized the 
President to parcel tribal land to individual tribal members in "allot-
ments" of 40, 80, or 160 acres. Any surplus land was to be purchased 
by the Secretary of Interior with proceeds used to further Indian 
education and "civilization." Originally, each allotment was to be 
held in trust by the United States for at least twenty-five years. At the 
end of this time, or a longer time should it be determined necessary 
in individual cases, the Government issued a fee patent to the land, 
free of liens and debts, to the allottee or his heirs. Inheritance was 
determined according to state law. 
The general theory underlying the allotment policy was that an 
individual Indian who mvned his own plot of land would thereby be 
transformed into a farmer or livestock operator. Presumably, the in-
dividual was to absorb European values to go with his new status. 
Individual mvnership plus increased contact with whites was to teach 
the Indian to be both civilized and self-supporting, one consequence 
of which would be to relieve the Government of the need for further 
supervision of Indian affairs and life. Another consequence, of_course, 
was to throw open to whites huge quantities of land previously un-
available.29 There had been earlier allotments under treaties and 
laws that applied to certain individual tribes, so but the Dawes Act 
was the first to subdivide and redistribute land on a wholesale basis. 
By all accounts, the allotment policy was a disaster.31 Destruction 
of the land base had the immediate effect of reducing tribal control 
of internal affairs to almost a nullity. Further, although the Indian 
culture was widely diverse from tribe tq tribe, nowhere did that cul-
26. Act of March 3, 1893, ch. 209, § 1, 27 Stat. 635 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 283 (1970)). 
27. See BROPHY COMMISSION, supra note 18, at 9, 149-51. 
28. Ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, as amended, ch. 9, 25 U.S.C. (1970). 
29. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 7902 Before the House Comm. on Indian Affairs, 73d 
Cong., 2d Sess., at 16 (1934) [hereinafter 1934 House Hearings]; BROPHY COMMISSION, 
supra note 18, at 18-20. 
30. E.g., Treaty of Sept. 20, 1816, art. 4, 7 Stat. 150 (Chickasaws); Treaty of July 18, 
1817, art. 8, 7 Stat. 159 (Cherokees). 
31. See, e.g., 1934 House Hearings, supra note 29, at 15-18 (memorandum by Commr. 
Collier); BROPHY CoMMISSioN, supra note 18, at 18-20. 
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ture contain anything to prepare the individual Indian to become a 
farmer or to assume the incidents of private ownership. Finally, the 
Act itself made no provision for training or credit. 
The allotment era extended from 1887 to 1934, when the IRA 
ended the practice completely in so far as it applied to tribally owned 
lands.s2 Publication of the Meriam Report38 in 1928 caused a signifi-
cant slowdown of allotment parceling,84 but by then the damage had 
been done. Before the dust settled, 246,569 separate assignments of 
land had been made totaling nearly 41 million acres.86 The damage 
in loss of land base was astounding. Between 1887 and 1934 tribal 
land holdings were reduced from about 138 million acres to only 48 
million acres.s6 
During the period preceding the enactment of the IRA there was 
some recognition that Indians were living in grinding poverty, that 
Indian health and education were in an abominable state, and that 
government policies were not working. As early as 1881 books like 
Helen Hunt Jackson's crusading A Century of Dishonor had exposed 
these conditions to public view and made people aware of broken 
treaties and other unfulfilled promises. But it was not until publica-
tion of the Meriam Report that a movement toward change began. 
The Report is an extremely detailed document, describing and an-
alyzing the entire spectrum of Indian life and the problems of gov-
ernmental administration of Indian affairs. It brought these problems 
into sharp focus, and in so doing presaged more than any other work 
the enactment of the IRA six years later.37 
The basic position taken by the Meriam staff was that 
[t]he object of work with or for the Indians is to fit them either to 
merge into the social and economic life of the prevailing civilization 
as developed by the whites or to live in the presence of that civiliza-
tion at least in accordance with a minim.um standard of health and 
decency.ss 
If this goal were accomplished, as the staff saw it, there would be no 
need for further governmental supervision. This position did not 
imply automatic cultural assimilation, however. The authors of the 
Report recognized explicitly that many Indians wished to maintain 
a separate cultural identity, although they also admitted this would 
32. 25 u.s.c. § 461 (1960). 
33. !NSTlTUTE FOR GOVT. R.F.5EARCH, STUDIES IN .AD1,0NISTRATION, THE PRODLD{ OF 
INDIAN .ADMINISTRATION (1928) [hereinafter MERIAM: REPORT]. 
34. BROPHY CoMMISSION, supra note 18, at 20. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
37. See F. CoHEN, supra note 2, at 83. 
38. MERIAM REPORT, supra note 33, at 86. i I 
~I• -
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be difficult in so far as the economic underpinnings of the old culture 
had been destroyed.89 
The process of allotment as historically administered was criti-
cized, 40 as were other approaches to the "Indian problem": 
The work of the government directed toward the education and ad-
vancement of the Indian himself ... is largely ineffective. The chief 
explanation ... lies in the fact that the government has not appro-
priated enough funds to permit the Indian Service to employ an 
adequate personnel properly qualified for the task before it.41 
The Meriam staff sought to redirect the approach to Indian affairs 
by development of the social services necessary to enable Indians to 
reach a level of self-support. 
There were many other specific recommendations, among which 
was the suggestion that "[t]horough mature consideration ... be given 
to the possibilities of using the corporate form of organization for 
tribal property that consists of great natural resources which cannot 
be economically administered or developed in small allotments."42 
Although the Report did not recommend corporations as a means of 
developing Indian community life and civic organization, its recom-
mendations for those aspects of Indian life could be effectuated by 
utilization of the corporate form.48 
The recommendations of the Meriam Report fell short of the 
broad-ranging goals later expressed by the IRA. For example, decen-
tralization of authority was recommended, but to local Indian agents 
rather than to the tribes themselves.44 Still, the publication of this 
work was an event of major importance in the history of Indian af-
fairs and was a significant stimulus in the direction the IRA was later 
to follow. 
II. THE INDIAN R.EoRGANIZATION Acr OF 1934 
A. A Brief Legislative History 
The Wheeler-Howard Bill, as the originally proposed legislation 
was known, was entitled an act "[t]o grant to Indians living under 
Federal tutelage the freedom to organize for purposes of local self-
government and economic enterprise."45 The bill represented a sig-
39. Id. at 86-89. 
40. Id. at 41-42. 
41. Id. at 8. 
42. Id. at 462. The Report went on to suggest as "outstanding possibilities" for ex-
perimentation ·with this idea the K.lamaths of Oregon and the Menominees of Wis-
consin, the most important of the tribes that were later "terminated" in the 1950's. 
Id. For an explanation of the termination policy, see note 159 infra. 
43. See MERIAM REPORT, supra note 33, at 629-45. 
44. Id. at 113, 140-54. . 
45. H.R. 7902, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), and S. 2755, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) 
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nificant change in the approach to Indian legislation. Although the 
original Wheeler-Howard Bill was greatly restructured in the final 
version that became the IRA, some knowledge of its provisions is 
useful. 
Title I of the Wheeler-Howard Bill, "Indian Self-Government," 
was the heart of the proposed legislation. In it were set forth the broad 
principles of self-government and the specific policy goal that "those 
functions of government now exercised over Indian reservations by 
the Federal Government through the Department of Interior and 
the Office of Indian Affairs shall be gradually relinquished and trans-
ferred to the Indians of such reservations .... "46 
The vehicle contemplated for realization of this goal was orga-
nization "for municipal and other purposes."47 Title I provided for 
issuance of charters "granting to the ... community group any or 
all of such powers of government and such privileges of corporate or-
ganization and economic activity, hereinafter enumerated, as may 
seem fitting"48 in light of a particular group's experience. Some man-
datory charter requirements were imposed, such as a provision deline-
ating membership criteria.49 In addition, optional powers were listed, 
among which was the power 
[t]o organize and act as a Federal municipal corporation, to establish 
a form of government, to adopt and thereafter to amend a constitu-
tion, and to promulgate and enforce ordinances ... and [to exercise] 
any other functions customarily exercised by local governments.GO 
The term "constitution" was not used elsewhere in the bill. Unlike 
the final Act, which contemplates adoption of a constitution as the 
principal organizational method, the original bill was centered 
around the concept of the municipal-type corporate charter. The re-
mainder of Title I established procedures for adopting a charter and 
enumerated the powers and duties of chartered tribes and of the 
Secretary of Interior and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. 
[hereinafter S. 2755]. The bill was introduced into the House by Representative Howard 
on Feb. 12, 1934, 78 CONG. REc. 2437 (1934), and into the Senate by Senator Wheeler 
one day later, 78 CoNG. REc. 2440 (1934). The authorship of the bill is unclear, although 
the bill was apparently the product of a joint effort by Commissioner of Indian Affairs 
John Collier and Assistant Solicitor of the Department of Interior Felix S. Cohen. 
46. S. 2755, supra note 45, tit. I, § I (1934). 
47. Id. 
48. Id., tit. I, § 2. 
49. Id., tit. I, § 3. Also specifically required was a provision guaranteeing "the civil 
liberties of minorities and individuals within the community, including the liberty of 
conscience, worship, speech, press, assembly, and association." Id. This provision was 
dropped from the final version. A forcible application of these guarantees on the 
tribes did not appear again in federal legislation until 1968. Civil Rights Act of 1968, 
Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 201-03, 82 Stat. 77 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1801-03 (1970)). See 
note 159 infra. 
50. S. 2755, supra note 45, tit. I, § 4(a). 
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Title IV established a federal court of Indian affairs. This court 
would have taken over original jurisdiction from the district courts 
in certain matters such as crimes against the United States committed 
on a reservation and commercial disputes between a tribe and out-
siders. 61 Furthermore, the court would have appellate jurisdiction 
over the tribal courts in those cases in which it would have original 
jurisdiction.62 All mention of these special courts was eliminated 
from the final Act, primarily because the committee members and 
Indians disagreed, ·with each other and among themselves, whether 
they would be a boon or a hindrance to tribal sovereignty.63 
After the Wheeler-Howard Bill was introduced in February of 
1934, extensive hearings were held in both houses of Congress.64 As 
these hearings progressed, it became apparent that disagreement over 
the effects of the bill was deep. Various suggestions for amendment 
were made before the Senate Committee, but by mid-May progress 
had nearly stopped. Fearful that the proposed legislation would not 
be passed, the proponents took drastic action. The bill was quickly 
rewritten and all its controversial provisions were discarded.65 In its 
new form, 66 the bill was barely recognizable. This new version, as 
amended, became the IRA.67 The major objectives and philosophy 
behind the legislation, however, remained unchanged. 
51. Id., tit. IV, §§ 3-4. 
52. Id., tit. IV, § 5. 
53. Titles II and III were less immediately related to questions of tribal sovereignty. 
Title II concerned "Special Education for Indians." The Commissioner was directed 
to train Indians for jobs through the use of existing or new facilities. An important 
innovation was the specifically declared policy of promoting the study of Indian culture 
in Indian schools. 
Title m dealt with Indian lands. Most of its provisions were carried over in sub-
stance into the IRA. One particularly interesting provision of this Title, however, did 
not find its way into the final Act. Section 14 would have allowed "classification" of 
reservation land into units according to economic suitability. It was in effect a zoning 
enabling provision. 
54. Hearings on S. 2755 Before the Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs, '73d Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1934) [hereinafter 1934 Senate Hearings]; 1934 House Hearings, supra note 29. 
55. As Senator Wheeler put it, "The bill as it originally came from the Department 
had many objectionable features, which were eliminated from it. Many of the Indians 
throughout the country were opposed to the original bill, and the committee was 
opposed to it, and amended it ••• as it is now framed." '78 CoNG. REc. 11124 (1934). 
The Senate Committee, on May 1'7, had the new version of the bill before it; and the 
new bill, renumbered as S. 3645, was introduced into the Senate on May 18. '78 CONG. 
REc. 9071 (1934). 
56. S. 3645, '73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). 
5'7. Debate in the Congress did not begin until after the introduction of the new 
bill, S. 3645, The Senate Committee reported out S. 3645 four days after its reintro-
duction, 78 CoNG. REc. 9221 (1934), and floor debate was taken up shortly thereafter. 
On June 12, the Senate passed the bill. Id. at 11139. The House began debate on 
June 15. Id. at 11724-44. By suspension of the rules, the original House bill, H.R. 7902, 
was laid on the table, and S. 3645 was passed in lieu of H.R. 7902 on the same day, 
with some variations. Id. A conference committee was formed immediately, and it 
submitted a report on June 16. Id. at 12001-04. The agreed-upon final version was that 
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B. The Act's Objectives: An Analytical Look Behind the Scenes 
The thrust of the IRA can be gathered from its operative provi-
sions. Every section in some way affects tribal self-government, al-
though obviously not all are equally relevant to this discussion.08 
Section I of the IRA ended the policy of allotment: "No land of 
any Indian reservation . . . shall be allotted in severalty to any 
Indian.''59 This provision, while not going directly to self-govern-
ment, was a key factor in making it possible; it alone assures the 
Act's historical significance. 
Section 4 related to alienation. In general, it prohibited any trans-
fer of Indian land or shares in the assets of tribal corporations other-
wise than to the tribe, except that the Secretary could authorize 
voluntary exchanges of such lands or interests of equal value when it 
would be "expedient and beneficial for or compatible with the proper 
consolidation of Indian lands.''60 This provision has had the desirable 
effect of further strengthening the tribal land base and tribal control 
over it. 
Section 10 set up a revolving fund from which the Secretary of 
Interior could make loans to chartered corporations for purposes of 
economic development.61 This reversed an earlier policy by which 
loans were made to individual Indians and under which there had 
been problems in repayment.62 Under the IRA, loans are made only 
to the tribes, with individual loans being arranged between the tribe 
and the individual.63 Also, section II appropriated a small amount 
of funds to be used for loans to Indians for tuition payment and other 
expenses in "recognized vocational and trade schools" and in high 
schools and colleges.64 
Section 18 provided that the Act would not apply to any reserva-
tion wherein a majority of the adult Indians voted against its appli-
cation at a special election to be held within one year after the Act's 
which became the IRA. Both houses of Congress approved it on June 16. Id. at 12001-
04, 12161-65. It was presented to the President on June 18, id. at 12340, and was signed 
on that date, id. at 12451. 
58. For a summary of the provisions of the entire Act, see F. CoHEN, supra note 2, 
at 84-85. 
59. 25 u.s.c. § 461 (1970). 
60. 25 u.s.c. § 464 (1970). 
61. 25 u.s.c. § 470 (1970). 
62. Cohen, The Erosion of Indian Rights, 1950-195:J: A. Case Study in Bureaucracy, 
62 YALE L.J. 348, 369 n.81 (1953) (citing unpublished report showing a 44% delinquency 
rate in 1933) [hereinafter Erosion of Rights]. 
63. See 25 U.S.C. § 470 (1970). Tribes borrowing under this provision have main• 
tained a default rate of less than 1 %, See Erosion of Rights, supra note 62, at 369. 
64. 25 U.S.C. § 471 (1970). Substantially more funds had been previously authorized, 
through quite different procedures, for Indian education and other purposes by the 
Johnson-O'Malley Act of April 16, 1934, ch. 147, 48 Stat. 596, as amended, 25 U.S.C. 
§§ 452-54 (1970). 
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approval.65 This section marked a significant change in approach to 
Indian legislation. Formerly, legislation had been either special, ap-
plying by its terms to only one tribe or group of tribes,66 or general, 
applying to all Indians without consideration of tribal differences.67 
Through section 18, the IRA became a type of enabling act, giving 
each tribe the opportunity to determine for itself whether it wanted 
to come under the Act. There was, however, a major flaw in the ap-
proach: a tribe could hold the election only once. If it voted against 
application, it did not have the option of later reconsideration.68 
The essence of the IRA lay in those provisions relating directly to 
tribal organization, viz., sections 16 and 17. The former provided: 
Any Indian tribe, or tribes, residing on the same reservation, shall 
have the right to organize for its common welfare, and may adopt an 
appropriate constitution and by-laws ..•. [Procedure is then estab-
lished for ratification by members and approval by the Secretary of 
Interior]. 
In addition to all powers vested in any tribe or tribal council by 
existing law, the constitution adopted by said tribe shall also vest in 
such tribe or its tribal council the following rights and powers: To 
employ legal counsel, the choice of counsel and fixing of fees to be 
subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior; to prevent 
the sale, disposition, lease, or encumbrance of tribal lands, interests 
in lands, or other tribal assets without the consent of the tribe; and to 
negotiate with the Federal, State, and local governments .... 69 
Section 17 first provided for issuance of a charter of incorporation to 
a tribe and established procedures for petition and ratification. It 
continued: 
Such charter may convey to the incorporated tribe the power to pur-
chase, take by gift, or bequest, or otherwise, o,m, hold, manage, 
operate, and dispose of property of every description, real and per-
sonal, including the power to purchase restricted Indian lands and to 
issue in exchange therefor interests in corporate property, and such 
further powers as may be incidental to the conduct of corporate 
65. 25 U.S.C. § 478 (1970). The time for holding elections was extended another year 
by Act of June 15, 1935, ch. 260, § 2, 49 Stat. 378. 
66. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 591-94a (1970) (Chippewa Tribe of Minnesota); 25 U.S.C. 
§§ 671-76b-1 (1970) (Ute Indians of Utah). 
67. See, e.g., General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, as amended, ch. 9, 
25 u.s.c. (1970). 
68. It might still be possible to organize outside the IRA, but IRA funds would not 
then be available. 
69. 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1970). The reasons for the rather unusual juxtaposition of the 
terms "constitution" and "by-laws" are obscure. All tribes that adopted constitutions 
pursuant to the IRA also appear to have adopted by-laws. These by-laws may be un-
necessary, since, for the most part, they contain governmental provisions that easily 
could have been written into the constitutions. See, e.g., By-Laws of the Stockbridge 
Munsee Community of Wisconsin, in CHARTERS, CONSTITUTIONS AND BY-LAws OF INDIAN 
TRIBES OF NORTH A.MERICA, pt. II, at 112-13 (G. Fay ed. 1967) [hereinafter G. FAY]. 
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business, not inconsistent with law; but no authority shall be granted 
to sell, mortgage, or lease for a period exceeding ten years any of the 
land included in the limits of the reservation. Any charter so issued 
shall not be revoked or surrendered except by Act of Congress,70 
The purpose of adopting a charter is different than that of adopting 
a constitution, the charter being oriented more toward business than 
toward governmental organization. 71 
Perhaps the prime objective of the IRA, which was crucial to any 
effective establishment of self-government, was elimination of the 
"absolutist" executive discretion previously exercised by the Interior 
Department and the Office of Indian Affairs. During the hearings, 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs John Collier presented to the House 
Committee examples which revealed the vastness of this discretionary 
power.72 Not only had administrative power grown beyond control, 
but its exercise and the effects of its exercise also changed from year 
to year, depending on the attitude or whim of a given commissioner. 
Further, this discretionary power was also exercised by local agency 
superintendents, a situation that led Senator Wheeler to refer to the 
local agent as "a czar."73 So all-encompassing was this power that "the 
Department [had] absolute discretionary powers over all organized 
expressions of the Indians. . . . [T]ribal councils exist[ ed] by [the 
Department's] sufferance and [had] no authority except as ... granted 
by the Department."74 Consequently, the IRA sought to eliminate 
this boundless discretion or at least place a damper on its exercise. 
"This bill ... seeks to get away from the bureaucratic control of the 
Indian Department, and it seeks further to give the Indians the con-
trol of their own affairs . . . . "75 
It was not entirely clear, however, precisely what changes were to 
be made. Commissioner Collier was the moving force behind the new 
administrative approach. Of course, as Commissioner, he already 
possessed broad powers to move the Indian Office in the desired direc-
tion. Apparently, however, he was one of that rare breed of adminis-
trators who seek actively to undermine their own powers through 
legislation. To be sure, the Office would not become powerless under 
the Act. Subsequent developments have shown that it can and will 
70. 25 u.s.c. § 477 (1970). 
71. Typical charters include provisions on borrowing money, making contracts, and 
handling funds. See, e.g., Corporate Charter of the Lower Brule Tribe of South Dakota, 
§ 5, in G. FAY, supra note 69, pt. I, at 36-37; Corporate Charter of the Lac Du Flambeau 
Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of the Lac Du Flambeau Reservation, Wis• 
consin, in G. FAY, supra, pt. II, at 24-25. 
72. 1934 House Hearings, supra note 29, at 47-48. 
73. 78 CONG. R.Ec. 11125 (1934). 
74. 1934 House Hearings, supra note 29, at 52 (memorandum of Commr. Collier), 
75. 78 CoNG. R.Ec. 11125 (1934) (remarks of Sen. Wheeler). 
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exercise much power, often to the detriment of its constituency.76 
And the Commissioner himself, in a memorandum to the House 
Committee, said, "The bill does not bring to an end, or imply or 
contemplate, a cessation of Federal guardianship ..•. On the con-
trary, it makes permanent the guardianship services, and reasserts 
them .... "77 He sharply distinguished between these "guardianship 
services," which he sought to retain, and administrative absolutism. 
Commissioner Collier's goal was to move toward the elimination of 
the Office of Indian Affairs in its present capacity and he hoped that 
it would "ultimately exist as a purely advisory and special service 
body [ as is] the Department of Agriculture [vis-a-vis] American farm.-
ers,"78 a goal as yet unrealized. 
Throughout the hearings there were repeated statements evidenc-
ing the desire to trim administrative power. Those concerned with 
Indian affairs well recognized the futility of attempts at tribal self-
government as long as this power remained unchecked. Such "unlim-
ited and largely unreviewable exercise of administrative discretion 
. . . [had] been one of the chief sources of complaint"79 by Indians. 
The Commissioner attempted to assure those concerned that it was 
"the chief object of the bill to terminate such bureaucratic authority 
by transferring the administration of the Indian Service to the Indian 
communities themselves."80 But such assurances were not enough to 
assuage the fears of those opposed to excessive bureaucratic control. 
The problem was that the original bill on its face retained broad 
governmental powers to review and even to veto tribal actions. 81 An 
attorney who belonged to the Omaha Tribe of Nebraska, testifying 
against the original bill, brought this problem into sharp focus.82 
He expressed concern not only about past bureaucratic authority but 
also about the proposed continuance of that authority. As justifica-
tion for his fears, he cited a case holding that there was no judicial 
review of departmental exercise of discretionary powers, generally 
on the theory that the decisions of the Secretary of Interior were made 
final and conclusive by various federal statutes.83 But the real prob-
76. See generally Erosion of Rights, supra note 62. 
77. 1934 House Hearings, supra note 29, at 20. 
78. Id. at 22. 
79. Id. (memorandum of Commr. Collier). 
80. Id. 
81. See S. 2755, supra note 45, tit. I, §§ 3-5, 9. 
82. 1934 House Hearings, supra note 29, at 152 (statement of Thomas Sloan). 
83. Id., citing Red Hawk v. Wilber, 39 F.2d 293 (D.C. Cir. 1930) (decision of Secretary 
regarding distribution of alloted lands of Indian dying before issuance of patent held 
not reviewable by court). The doctrine remains alive in Indian law. See, e.g., Twin 
Cities Chippewa Tribal Council v. Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, 370 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 
1967) (discretionary action of Secretary approving amendments to tribal constitution 
held not reviewable even under the Administrative Procedure Act). 
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lem, as he saw it, was not high level exercise of these powers. Rather, 
"[t]he trouble with the actual administration of affairs is that the 
Secretary himself does not exercise [these] authorities; they are exer-
cised by superintendents who are not in sympathy with the Indian. 
• • ."84 The result was that the local agents, by exercising these 
statutory authorities, had obtained nearly absolute control over all 
aspects of Indian life. This sad fact, combined with general unavail-
ability of judicial review, produced much of the existing agony. If 
the Act could change this, it would accomplish much.86 
Prior to the IRA, formulation of policy respecting Indian affairs 
generally was made without consultation of the tribes concerned. 
The IRA sought to alter this approach so that "in the future the 
Indians would be consulted and their views followed, if feasible, in 
the formulation of new policy."86 The importance of this new ap-
proach is difficult to overemphasize. "Even when the [Indians are 
not properly consulted] ... the very acceptance of the philosophy of 
consent and conference is a restraint on arbitrary administrative ac-
tion. An administrator who is aware that his thinking will be sub-
jected to the careful scrutiny of the Indians and their friends will be 
inclined to review [new programs] most carefully."87 Until founder-
ing on the rocks of "termination" in the 1950's,88 this new approach 
proved its over-all worth.89 The IRA did not, however, accomplish 
all that was promised toward granting autonomy to the tribes. Even 
under the final Act, the Secretary was empowered to review many 
actions of the tribal governments, 00 and still retains close control over 
tribal government.91 The rationale for this federal control was that 
at the time of the adoption of tribal constitutions and charters under 
84. 1934 House Hearings, supra note 29, at 152. 
85. An interesting suggestion was forwarded by a representative of the Mission 
Indians of Southern California: "We believe that if a direct, simple method of recall-
ing or removing or transferring tbe superintendent were present, most all of tbe ills to 
which tbe Indians are subjected would be removed." 1934 House Hearings, supra note 
29, at 261. Discussion surrounding tbis presentation revealed tbat local agents or super• 
intendents could be continued in office almost indefinitely by tbe commissioner, appar• 
ently on tbe theory tbat such tenure was necessary to tbeir job security. The tribes 
had no right to remove tbe agent; tbey could do no more tban request transfer. 
86. Haas, The Indian Reorganization Act in Historical Perspective, in NATIVE .Ar.rnn-
ICAN LAW MANUAL 488, 491 (M. Price ed. 1970) [hereinafter M. PRICE]. 
87. Id. at 491-92. Commissioner Collier, who, as usual, had anticipated tbe new 
approach, held nearly a dozen conferences throughout tbe country in early 1934 to 
propose and explain tbe bill to Indians and to hear their suggestions and criticisms. 
See F. COHEN, supra note 2, at 84. 
88. See note 159 infra. 
89. See BROPHY COMMISSION, supra note 18, at 22; M. PRICE, supra note 86, at 493. 
90. See 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1970). 
91. See, e.g., Constitution and By-Laws of tbe Red Cliff Band of Lake Superior 
Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin, art. II, § 3, in G. FAY, supra note 69, pt. II, at 49; 
Constitution of Oreavilla Apache Tribe of New Mexico, art. III, § 3, in G. FAY, s1,pra, 
pt. III, at 5. 
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the IRA, most Indians had had little experience in managing their 
own affairs.92 In large part, of course, this was true of the generation 
of Indian leaders in the 1930's primarily because of the application 
of administrative authority in harsh form during the preceding years. 
The sponsors and supporters of the IRA saw in it a major change 
in the pattern of Indian governance. It would be incorrect, however, 
to assume that constitutional self-government was a new phenomenon 
in Indian affairs in an historical or legal sense. A survey of the Indian 
legal experience suggests that the IRA was really resurrecting and 
revitalizing older forms and concepts. 
C. The Prior Indian Legal Experience and the Effect of the IRA 
The origins of the concept of tribal autonomy and of the inherent 
right to self-government have previously been discussed.93 Case law 
has established that in the absence of congressional action this right 
includes not only the power to adopt and operate under a form of 
government of the Indians' choice,94 but also the power to do such 
things as regulate domestic relations of tribal members,95 levy taxes,96 
regulate property within tribal jurisdiction, 97 and administer jus-
tice. 98 If all of these powers already existed, why then was it necessary 
to enact legislation "granting" to the tribes the power to organize for 
purposes of self-government and to exercise these individual powers? 
This inquiry becomes even more pertinent when one considers the 
history of tribal political organization. 
The first federal constitution on the American continent was 
probably the Great Binding Law, or Ne Gayaneshagowa, of the Iro-
quois League, developed during the :fifteenth century.99 This consti-
tution established a government subject to public opinion.100 One 
purpose of this loose confederacy was self-protection. The war-making 
power was exercised only on approval of the governing council.101 
In accordance with the concept of federalism, this council had no 
92. 13ROPHY CoMMISSION, supra note 18, at 35. 
93. See text accompanying notes 3-9 supra. 
94. Cf. Pueblo of Santa Rosa v. Fall, 273 U.S. 315, 319-20 (1927) (dictum tbat tribal 
law determined authority of agent). See generally Solicitor's Opinion, Power of Indian 
Tribes, 55 Interior Dec. 14, 30-32 (1934). 
95. See, e.g., United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602 (1916). 
96. See Duster v. Wright, 135 F. 947 (8th Cir. 1905), appeal dismissed, 203 U.S. 599 
(1906). 
97. See Sizemore v. Brady, 235 U.S. 441, 447 (1914) (dictum). 
98. See Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883). 
99. The Iroquois League was also known as tbe Five Nations, and consisted orig-
inally of tbe Seneca, Cayuga, Onondaga, Oneida, and Mohawk tribes. The League 
became tbe Six Nations with the admission of the Tuscarora in 1724. PARKER ON THE 
IROQUOIS (W. Fenton ed. 1968); C. CoLDEN, THE HISTORY OF THE FIVE NATIONS (1958 ed.). 
100. C. COLDEN, supra note 99, at xx. 
101. Id. 
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power to interfere with internal affairs of the various member tribes. 
The highly developed confederacy of the Iroquois foreshadowed in 
many respects the federal system in the United States. 
Probably the best known early Indian constitutions were those 
of the so-called Five Civilized Tribes,102 especially that of the Chero-
kee Nation, first adopted in 1827 .103 The Cherokee constitution was 
reduced to ·writing as early as 1839.104 So amazing was this document 
that one court was prompted to say of it, more than a half century 
later: 
[F]or more than half a century it has met the requirements of a race 
steadily advancing in prosperity and education and enlightenment 
so well that it has needed, so far as they are concerned, no material 
alteration or amendment, and deserves to be classed among the few 
great works of intelligent statesmanship which outlive their own 
times .... And it is not the least of [these] successes ... that the 
judiciary of another nation are able, with entire confidence in the 
clearness and wisdom of its provisions, to administer it .... 100 
Although the Cherokee constitution was perhaps the most outstand-
ing example, there were many others, less well known.100 "The writ-
ing of Indian constitutions under the [IRA] is therefore no new thing 
in the legal history of this continent .... "107 
It is, of course, not essential that a tribe or any group of people 
have a ·written constitution before they can govern themselves. The 
right to self-government exists as well in tribes whose organizational 
structure may have been based on ancient custom or tradition. Cer-
tainly all the tribes were not politically developed to the same degree, 
and therefore some were less able than others to put into practice 
their inherent governmental powers. Nonetheless, these powers ex-
isted in all the tribes. 
Indian tribes seem also to have been regarded as corporate bodies 
for some purposes prior to enactment of the IRA. In at least one 
instance there had been specific incorporation by legislative act.108 
102. The Five Tribes were the Cherokee, Chickasaw, Choctaw, Creek, and Seminole 
nations, See A. JOSEPHY, supra note 9, at 107. 
103. STARR'S HISTORY OF THE CHEROKEE INDIANS 55 cr. Gregory &: R. Strickland ed. 
1967). 
104. The Constitution and Laws of the Cherokee Nation, 1839-51 (1852) (published 
by the Cherokee Nation at Tah-le-quah, in Cherokee language). 
105. Journcycake v. Cherokee Nation, 28 Ct. Cl. 281, 318 (1893), afld., 155 U.S. 196 
(1894). For more on the Cherokee and their development, sec R. CoTIERILL, THE SOUTH• 
ERN INDIANS (1954); M. WARDELL, A POLIIICAL HISTORY OF THE CHEROKEE NATION, 1887• 
1907 (1938); G. WOODWARD, THE CHEROKEES (1968). 
106. Cohen lists sixty-five tribes for which written constitutions or other organic 
documents were recorded in the Interior Department prior to 1984. F. CoHEN, supra 
note 2, at 129 n.59. 
107. F. CoHEN, supra note 2, at 129. 
108. Leyes del Territorio de Nuevo Mexico 1851, at 418-19 (incorporation of certain 
Pueblos). 
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Further, if the term "corporation" is used in the broader sense of 
designating an identifiable group of people to whom a legal person-
ality is affixed, then it becomes clear that tribes have often been 
assigned a corporate status. For example, there were federal statutes 
authorizing suits by injured persons against tribes whose members 
had committed various depredations.109 Under these statutes liability 
was tribal only; no liability was imposed on individual members. 
The distinction between the tribe and its members had also been 
emphasized in cases involving property rights110 and other common-
law legal rights. m 
The question of tribal capacity to sue and be sued, in the absence 
of statutory authority, also appeared occasionally. Where a tribe was 
recognized as a distinct political community or even as a political 
subdivision, it was immune from suit unless it had consented thereto, 
following the general rule of sovereign immunity.112 Moreover, when 
the tribe was immune, it was held that tribal officers could not be 
sued on tribal obligations.113 
Whether a tribe could bring suit without statutory authorization 
was a more difficult question, although probably answered in the af-
firmative. Cases in which tribes were parties to the suit have been 
entertained by the courts, apparently without any question of stand-
ing or capacity being raised.114 In any case, the objectives of such a 
suit could have been obtained through a representative suit brought 
by individual tribal members.115 
Thus, the powers and capacities "granted" to Indian tribes by 
the IRA had, in large part, previously existed. This fact has been 
recognized by those who have closely examined the Act. Commen-
tators have said, for example, that "the constitutions [ adopted pur-
suant to the IRA] add to, but do not detract, from, the powers of an 
Indian tribe .... "116 But precisely what was added? The answer is 
109. E.g., Act of March 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 1, 23 Stat. 376; Act of March 3, 1891, 
ch. 538, § I, 26 Stat. 851. See also Graham v. United States, 30 Ct. Cl. 318, 331-38 (1895). 
110. See Gritts v. Fisher, 224 U.S. 640 (1912) (individual Cherokees had no rights in 
land vested in tribe); Fleming v. McCurtain, 215 U.S. 56 (1909) (grant of land to Choc-
taws under treaty was to tribe as such, not to the then members). See generally F. CoHEN, 
supra note 2, at 183-94, 287-347. 
111. See, e.g., Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354 (1919) (tribe not liable at com-
mon law for torts committed by members); Parks v. Ross, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 362 (1850) 
(tribal officer not responsible for tribal debts). 
112. Thebo v. Choctaw Tribe, 66 F. 372 (8th Cir. 1895) (suit not maintainable against 
tribe without clear congressional authorization). See also United States v. United States 
Fid. &: Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506 (1940) (tribe also immune from cross-claim without con-
gressional authorization). 
113. Adams v. Murphy, 165 F. 304 (8th Cir. 1908). 
114. E.g., Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294 (1902); Pueblo of Zia v. United 
States, 168 U.S. 198 (1897). 
115. See, e.g., Fleming v. McCurtain, 215 U.S. 56, 57 (1909), a suit in equity by and 
on behalf of some 13,000 "persons of Choctaw or Chickasaw Indian blood and descent." 
116. M. PRICE, supra note 86, at 492. 
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that the IRA apparently added nothing in terms of specific substan-
tive powers. From this, however, it does not follow that the IRA ac-
complished nothing. As previously noted, the mere fact that Congress 
was willing, with the blessing of the Interior Department and the 
Indian Office, to enact such a statute signified an abrupt change in 
policy. Because of this policy change the tribes were able, at least 
temporarily, to coordinate effectively their organizational efforts and 
to use these powers for their benefit. 
Furthermore, the IRA can be said to have had a stabilizing effect 
on tribal powers.117 This effect is more significant in light of the ero-
sion of these powers that had taken place during the previous century. 
The IRA reaffirmed the principles of tribal self-government. Better 
organizational machinery could now be worked out through proper 
definition or limitation of tribal powers in the constitutions and 
charters. Finally, the mere act of organizing to write an organic in-
strument in the form of a constitution may have been a stimulus 
for more effective government, especially if the tribes could be as-
sured that their efforts would not be undermined by arbitrary ad-
ministrative action. 
D. Experience Under the IRA 
During the two-year period within which tribes could accept or 
reject the IRA,118 258 elections were held.119 In these elections, 181 
tribes (129,750 Indians) accepted the Act and 77 tribes (86,365 In-
dians, including 45,000 Navajos) rejected it.120 The IRA also applies 
to 14 groups of Indians who did not hold elections to exclude them-
selves.121 Within 12 years, 161 constitutions and 131 corporate char-
ters had been adopted pursuant to the IRA.122 The experience of 
these tribes has been as varied as the tribes themselves. It is difficult 
to determine whether this experience has on the whole been bene-
ficial. Such a judgment would depend on a great variety of factors, 
including previous political and organizational experience, available 
resources, and abilities of tribal leaders. For this reason, it would be 
unrealistic to pronounce a single judgment on the efficacy of the Act. 
117. Id. at 493. This stabilization, alas, could not last. See generally Erosion of 
Rights, supra note 62; note 159 infra. 
118. See note 65 supra. 
119. T. Hass, Ten Years Tribal Government Under IRA 3 (U.S. Indian Serv., Tribal 
Relations Pamphlets 1947) [hereinafter Haas]. This figure excludes tribes in Alaska 
and Oklahoma, which were brought under the Act automatically. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. It is not clear why elections were not held since the Act appears to require 
them. 25 U.S.C. § 478 (1970). 
122. Id., Table B, at 21-30. There are also some tribes that have accepted the IRA 
but operate under constitutions adopted previously, and other tribes not under the 
IRA which nevertheless operate under constitutions. Id., Tables C &: D, at 31-34. 
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Indeed, the diversity of experience suggests the presence of a minor 
paradox: the IRA seems to have led directly to both advances and 
reverses in tribal development. 
The constitutions and charters themselves vary considerably, es-
pecially with respect to the forms of government adopted, "ranging 
from ancient and primitive forms in tribes where such forms have 
been perpetuated, to models based on progressive white communi-
ties.''123 Likewise, the powers vested in the tribes through these· docu-
ments "vary in accordance with the circumstances, experience, and 
resources of the tribe."124 On the other hand, there are provisions 
which appear in most constitutions in nearly identical terms.125 Most 
governments established under the IRA, unlike federal and state 
governments, have no provision for the separation of powers. The 
governing body is the tribal council, and in many instances it acts 
in a legislative as well as executive capacity.126 The council members, 
acting either in their capacity as elected political officials or as direc-
tors of the tribal corporation, also manage the common resources of 
the tribe.127 While it is often assumed that such a unification of pow-
ers is undesirable, most tribes have operated well under a unified 
system. 
The law and order codes adopted by the various tribes reveal 
much about their approach to government. Tribes or other self-
governing Indian groups generally have adopted codes, although 
some instead use regulations promulgated for that purpose by the 
Secretary of Interior.128 The character of these codes differs pro-
foundly from that of state penal codes. Tribal codes typically de-
lineate forty or fifty offenses,129 whereas state codes, exclusive of local 
ordinances, often list hundreds or even thousands of offenses.130 The 
tribal codes generally do not contain the catch-all provisions, such as 
vagrancy and conspiracy, so common in state codes.131 Punishment 
under tribal codes has traditionally been much less severe, seldom 
exceeding imprisonment for six months even for such offenses as 
123. F. CoHEN, supra note 2, at 130. 
124. Id. 
125. Compare Constitution and By-laws of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe of South 
Dakota, art. III,§ 1, in G. FAY, supra note 69, pt. I, at 65, with Amended Constitution 
and By-laws of the San Carlos Apache Tribe of Arizona, in G. FAY, supra, pt. ill, at 36. 
126. See, e.g., Revised Constitution and By-laws of the Oneida Tribe of Indians of 
Wisconsin, art. III, in G. FAY, supra note 69, pt. II, at 84. 
127. See, e.g., Amended Charter of the Mescalero Apache Tribe of New Mexico, § 4, 
in G. FAY, supra note 69, pt. ill, at 14; Amended Charter of the Hualapai Tribe of 
Hualapai Reservation, Arizona, § 4, in G. FAY, supra, pt. ill, at 86. 
128. 25 C.F.R. §§ 11.1 to 11.306 (1971). 
129. Federal Courts, supra note 12, at 155-56. 
130. For example, in the Michigan statutes there are more than 3000 offenses calling 
for punishment. 
131. Federal Courts, supra note 12, at 156. 
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kidnapping.132 In fact, except for stating a maximum penalty, tribal 
penal codes often leave wide discretion in the tribal court to adjust 
penalties to circumstances of both the offense and the offender.133 
The form of punishment traditionally has not been imprisonment 
but rather forced labor for the benefit of the victim or the tribe.184 
Finally, the tribal codes are generally available to the members and 
are widely read and discussed.185 
Those in most direct contact with the IRA and the tribes oper-
ating thereunder give perhaps the best indication of tribal experi-
ence. The June 1939 issue of Indians at Work186 was devoted entirely 
to Indian reorganization, and contained many short pieces by tribal 
council members and federal field agents. Every article was full of 
praise for the IRA and encouragement for the future.187 Failures 
were attributed to lack of experience with self-govemment.138 An 
example of the kind of promise held out by the IRA can be found in 
Commissioner Collier's lead editorial, which quoted a letter from an 
Indian leader: 
"Before the fact of Indian organization, of Indian democracy under 
the Reorganization Act, can be an accomplished one, the Indians 
must come to the point of identifying themselves with the organic 
documents which are now theirs. They must come to the point of 
caring intensely, of speaking out, if necessary of fighting, for what 
comes to them at first as an inert possession."139 
Typical was an article by Willie George, Chairman of the Tribal 
Council of the Shoshone-Bannock tribes of the Fort Hall Reservation: 
Since we have organized under this Reorganization Act, the council 
is doing things for the people. We had organized councils before, 
but they were different. For one thing, the people are listening to the 
council as they never did under the old system. And then, the council 
has certain powers in handling the affairs of the reservation which it 
never had before .... 
Since the Indians took up the new Reorganization Act, the council 
has taken over a lot of work that the Agent used to do for them,140 
132. Id. Kidnapping, although a serious crime, has not been added to the list of 
crimes taken from tribal jurisdiction. See note 17 supra and accompanying text, 
133. Federal Courts, supra note 12, at 156. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. Cohen concludes that "[t]he comparison suggests that perhaps the Indian 
penal codes may be more 'civilized' than the non-Indian." Id. 
136. This magazine was published by the Department of Interior, Office of Indian 
Affairs. Its life span was twelve years, lasting from August 1933 to June 1945. 
137. E.g., Land Purchases in Nevada, INDIANS AT Worut, June 1939, at 11; Jennings, 
Indian Reorganization, id. at 13; Mustard, Rehabilitation on the Land, id. at 24, 
138. Reifel, Organizing the Sioux, id. at 29. 
139. Id. at 3, 6-7, quoting D'Arcy McNickles, a Flathead Indian. 
140. Id. at 31, 31·32. 
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Not everyone, however, agreed with this optimistic assessment. 
In 1945 a bill to repeal the IRA was introduced in Congress. 141 This 
bill simply provided for the repeal of the IRA and its amendments 
and the disposition of unexpended funds. No indication was given 
concerning the fate of existing constitutions and charters. In the brief 
hearings held on this bill, the Senators' questions and other testimony 
demonstrated how poorly the IRA was understood. The committee 
members repeatedly found it necessary to refer questions for clarifica-
tion to Commissioner of Indian Affairs William A Brophy and 
former Assistant Solicitor Felix S. Cohen.142 These hearings show that 
Indians on the same reservation had conflicting opinions on the IRA. 
In opposition to the Act, Peter Red Elk of the Pine Ridge Sioux, who 
claimed to represent a majority of the tribe, stated that "[t]here is 
no more authority in the tribal council because of the [IRA] .... 
The superintendent is the one who has all the authority. It is a fact 
that under the [IRA], all authority the Indians previously had has 
now been taken away."148 Peter Red Elk charged that the vote taken 
on application of the IRA was invalid because "[m]embers of the 
tribe woh [sic] never voted were fraudulently signed up as though 
they were in favor of the act."144 Another complaint was the alleged 
discriminatory distribution of tribal funds by the superintendent "in 
favor of the mixed bloods to the exclusion of the older full blood 
Indians ... who are asking for a repeal of the [IRA]."145 
Moses Two Bulls, a member of the tribal council of the Pine 
Ridge Sioux, disagreed strongly with Peter Red Elk and testified to 
the accomplishments resulting from organization under the IRA. He 
explained, for example, the operation of the tribal cattle business.146 
Capital came initially from IRA loan funds and the leasing of tribal 
lands. Cattle were purchased, raised, and marketed, with the goal of 
eventual tribal self-support. Employment of tribal members had 
grown. "We have tried to make a program which will benefit the 
whole tribe .... Before [the IRA], it was the superintendent and 
his representatives [who controlled the programs] .... Under this 
141. S. 978, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945). 
142. E.g., Hearings on S. 978 Before the Senate Comm. on Indian A.flairs, 79th Cong., 
2d Sess. 4, 15 (1946) [hereinafter 1946 Hearings]. 
143. Id. at 7. 
144. Id. The Pine Ridge vote was taken on October 27, 1934. Of a voting population 
of 4075, 2264 voted: 1169 for, 1095 against. A constitution was approved on January 15, 
1936; no charter bad been ratified. Haas, supra note 119, Table A, at 19, Table B, 
at 25. Vine Deloria, a Sioux, has said of Sioux politics that "a ten-vote margin ••• is a 
landslide victory." V. DELORIA, CuSTER DIED FOR YOUR Srns: AN INDIAN MANIFESTO 29 
(Avon ed. 1969). 
145. 1946 Hearings, supra note 142, at 7. Peter Red Elk did not document his 
charges. His over-all testimony reveals his fear that the Indians would lose their 
allotted private lands and his desire to keep his, despite the fact that § 8 of the IRA, 
25 U.S.C. § 468 (1970), prohibited any such confiscation. 
146. 1946 Hearings, supra note 142, at 12-18. 
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law, the Indians are able to try a program for themselves and make 
it stick .... "147 
Senator Wheeler asked if Moses Two Bulls was in favor of the 
IRA. In response to this question and to the earlier testimony of 
Peter Red Elk and other critics, he stated: "Yes. We are just getting 
started. It is only 10 years old. How long did it take the United States 
Government to form a perfect organization? It takes time .... A man 
comes here and says this law is not good, after 10 years. That is too 
short a time."148 
There are numerous other testimonials to the success of the 
IRA.149 It would seem that advances under the Act have outnum-
bered shortcomings. In any case, the fact that some tribes may not 
have benefited from the Act does not justify blanket condemnation. 
One philosophy underlying the IRA was flexibility and consideration 
of differences among tribes. This philosophy was to be implemented 
by allowing the tribes to choose to be under the Act and to vary their 
governments and economic organizations. It is precisely this flexibil-
ity that sets the IRA apart from all previous major Indian legislation 
and justifies its continuation. 
A by-product of the IRA has been better control and management 
of tribal property. Under the earlier allotment policy the tribal land 
base was consistently diminished through the parceling of land to 
individual Indians; consequently, management of land use was diffi-
cult. Even after the IRA land management remained a problem on 
some reservations because of the earlier parceling.100 However, IRA 
funds have been used to reacquire much of this previously allotted 
land. Out of the renewed land base such developments as livestock 
cooperatives and tribal farming enterprises have arisen.101 
To be sure, the IRA has not worked perfectly. One major short-
coming has been the Act's inability to fulfill the promise of shifting 
to Indians the control of Indian affairs. The reasons for this failure 
are diverse, although a major factor has been bureaucratic attitude. 
As one report noted: 
The [IRA] illustrates how a law intended to strengthen tribal 
governments and to give the people responsible business experience 
through making their own decisions has in fact actually increased 
federal control over them .... [E]very constitution adopted under 
the statute requires the Secretary of the Interior to review nearly all 
147. Id. at 13. 
148. Id. 
149. See, e.g., J. CoLLIER, ON THE GLEAMING WAY 144-49 (1962) (the remarkable 
economic development of the Apache Tribes under the IRA); V. DELORIA, supra note 
144, at 141. 
150. Haas, supra note 119, at 8-9. For a discussion of the results of allotment, see 
text accomp~ying notes 32-36 Sllpra. 
151. Id. 
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ordinances in various categories, notably those which define and 
punish offenses. Similarly, every [IRA] charter subjects to such ap-
proval almost the entire amount that a tribe can spend or make con-
tracts for .... 
This refusal to allow Indians to learn by trial and error may have 
had warrant in the 1930's at the time the first constitutions were 
adopted, for most tribes then had little knowledge of how to conduct 
a modern government and transact business in corporate form. In-
deed, the corporate charters provided that the controls could be re-
moved as the tribe gained experience, but in most instances the 
restraints still remain, continuing to be imposed when new charters 
are adopted. 
This policy probably stems from the widespread belief among the 
[Bureau of Indian Affairs] staff that as "guardian" or "trustee," the 
Bureau itself must make the vital decisions .... [This idea] will con-
tinue to hamper tribal self-development until legislation or strong 
executive direction dispels the doubts of Bureau employees.152 
The IRA has encountered less subtle opposition from other quar-
ters. Even in the earliest stages of its history, Indians were not the only 
persons concerned with the IRA. A small, white propaganda machine 
existed in Muskogee, Oklahoma, the center of approximately 100,000 
Indians of the Five Civilized Tribes. This group had access to the 
news media, and it issued periodic charges that grossly misrepresented 
the Act and attributed fabricated statements to Commissioner Col-
lier.153 Through these charges ran the theme that the Act was a 
product of Moscow being put over on the Indians by the Roosevelt 
Administration and that it was an "inhumane, unconstitutional, and 
un-American scheme."154 A story based on "information" supplied 
by this group appeared in the New York Herald Tribune on April 
4, 1934.156 Under the headline "Commissioner of Indian Affairs 
Urges Tribesmen of Oklahoma To Accept Soviet Type of Rule," the 
story contained lies, distortions, and prophecies of horror, hardly 
conducive to acceptance of the IRA. Investigation revealed that this 
group had a substantial self-interest in defeating the IRA. The allot-
ment policy had reduced Oklahoma Indian landholdings from 15 
million acres to I½ million acres and had destroyed the tribes' ability 
to be self-supporting.156 Seventy-two thousand members were totally 
landless. If the law remained unchanged, most of the remaining land 
would soon shift to white ownership, presumably to some members 
of this group. The impact of such groups on the tribes' ability to 
152. BROPHY COMMISSION, supra note 18, at 34-35. 
153. See 1934 House Hearings, supra note 29, at 178-85 (account by Commr. Collier). 
154. Id. at 179. 
155. Reprinted in id. at 180. 
156. Id. at 183-84. 
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function effectively under the IRA, to say the least, has been less than 
beneficial. 
In other respects, tribal governments are not unlike governments 
everywhere, and suffer from defects in no way unique. Problems in-
clude "lack of leadership, lack of interest of the members, adminis-
trative incompetence, nepotism, too short terms for elective officials, 
insecure tenure of employees, factionalism, insufficient funds, inade-
quate tax resources, and inability to remove the causes of crime and 
of juvenile delinquency."157 Not all tribes have been plagued with 
these problems, of course; but where these problems exist, govern-
ment is weakened. The IRA could not eradicate the underlying 
human factors. As stated above, lack of money is a significant prob-
lem. While funds are often available for a variety of programs 
involving education, housing, or health, funds are not so easily 
obtainable for business credit, jobs, land purchasing, and tribal 
administration.158 Finally, congressional actions have also had a pro-
found impact on tribal self-government under the IRA. Chief among 
these is the "termination" policy of the 1950's, which set as a goal the 
abolition of tribal government and the Indians' special status and 
which substantially undermined much of the progress made under 
the IRA.159 
157. BROPHY COMMISSION, supra note 18, at 37. 
158. The Johnson-O'Malley Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 452-54 (1970), from which many funds 
come, authorizes appropriations for "the education, medical attention, agricultural 
assistance, and social welfare, including relief of distress" of Indians. 25 U.S.C. § 452 
(1970). These expenditures are made through a process of contracting between the 
Secretary of Interior and the states or their political subdivisions, who in turn apply 
the funds for the purposes indicated. Evidently there is no dollar limit on authorized 
appropriations. 
Section 10 of the IRA, 25 U.S.C. § 470 (1970), authorized a revolving loan fund of 
10 million dollars, increased in 1961 to 20 million dollars. These funds go directly to 
the tribes to be used for economic development, but always subject to the discretion 
and control of the Secretary. Expenditures under this provision are generally believed 
to have been too low. See BROPHY COMMISSION, supra note 18, at 22, For the tribal 
record in repayment of these loans, see note 62 supra. 
Two thirds of all Indian enterprises are now financed through private sources, U.S. 
BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, DEPT. OF INTERIOR, AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE FEDERAL Gov, 
ERNMENT 16 (1965), 
159. The concept of termination was first embodied in H.R. Con. Res, 108, 67 Stat, 
Bl32 (1953), which reversed, as a matter of policy, most IRA principles. The policy was 
partly carried out by Public Law 280, Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch, 505, 67 Stat. 588, as 
amended, 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1970), which conferred general jurisdiction 
over civil causes and criminal offenses in "Indian Country" on the states of California, 
Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin. Tribes within these states no longer 
exercise governmental functions independent of the state. Other states were granted 
authority to assume such jurisdiction by affirmative act, although since 1968 tribal 
consent has been required. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-22 (1970). A series of special acts 
"terminating" certain tribes followed. See generally Hearings, Joint Comms. on Interior 
and Insular Affairs, Subcomm. on Indian Affairs, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954) [hereinafter 
Termination Hearings]; BROPHY COMMISSION, supra note 18, at 179-213; V, DELORIA, 
supra note 144, at 60-82. 
Another action by Congress, which undercut tribal independence, was Title II of 
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In sum, the most that can be said with certainty about the impact 
of the IRA is that the experience of tribes exercising self-government 
under the Act has been mixed. Since the termination years, it is 
difficult to determine whether there has been a net gain or loss in 
tribal advancement under the Act. As one writer has stated, 
Under the [IRA] during the 1930's tribes were finally beginning to 
move .... 
In the 1950's and early 1960's tribes had to spend all pf their time 
defending their lands and treaty rights from the whims of the termi-
nationists. Little was done to develop the reservations because all 
energies went into saving them from obliteration. Finally in the 
1960's . . . funds began to become available for capital improve-
ments .... 160 
In the end it must be concluded that the experience of the tribes 
under the IRA has been positive. The Act provided a powerful 
stimulus to tribal governmental organization and in many cases so 
strengthened that organization as to enable continued development 
despite fluctuations in administrative policy. 
III. WHAT FUTURE ROLE FOR THE IRA? 
Such self-governing entities as tribal corporations will very likely 
play an even more significant role in future tribal development than 
they have in the past. Yet, the techniques by which future tribal de-
velopment will occur remain unclear. At the present time, there exists 
in Indian affairs a fundamental dilemma. On one side, there is the 
fact that after more than 300 years of subjection to white influence, 
Indians to a very large degree maintain a cultural identity separate 
and apart from the American mainstream. Recent movements such 
as "Red Power"161 indicate that this identity distinction is likely to 
continue. Tribes continue to demand greater political, economic, and 
cultural freedom from governmental control. There is everywhere 
expressed by Indians a deep-rooted fear that the termination policy 
of the 1950's will return.162 As one Indian group recently stated, 
the 1968 Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03 (1970), which in substance made the 
Bill of Rights applicable to tribal governments. Previously, courts had upheld tribal 
action exceeding constitutional limits imposed on the federal, state, and local 
governments. See, e.g., Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896); Native American Church 
v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1959). See generally Lazarus, Title II 
of the 1968 Civil Rights Act: An Indian Bill of Rights, 45 N.D. L. R.Ev. 337 (1969); Note, 
The Indian Bill of Rights and the Constitutional Status of Tribal Governments, 82 
HARV. L. R.Ev. 1343 (1969); and the numerous volumes of hearings on constitutional 
rights of the American Indian held by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary and 
the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 1962-1968. 
160. V. DELORIA, supra note 144, at 141. 
161. See generally S. STEINER, THE NEW INDIANS (1968). 
162. A recent administration policy statement rejected forced termination. Message 
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"Indian tribes nearly unanimously wish to retain exclusive jurisdic-
tion vis-a-vis the states, over their mvn affairs."163 
Concurrently, however, Indian groups are making increased de-
mands on the states for services, especially in the areas of education 
and welfare. It is here the dilemma arises. The states may not con-
tinue to tolerate a situation that may require them to perform these 
services and at the same time forces them to recognize the special 
status that may free tribes from state taxation164 and such controls 
as conservation regulations.165 It has been suggested that "tension 
between tribal and Western culture will pose an increasingly difficult 
challenge to Federal Indian law."166 The fundamental challenge of 
the future is to discover means by which existing laws and forms 
can be used to anticipate these problems and to plan intelligent 
solutions. It is submitted that the corporate form of organization, in 
both political and economic contexts, is a device particularly applica-
ble to the resolution of these problems. First, the majority of tribes 
are presently incorporated under the IRA.107 Where such corporate 
organization exists, it seems to be the logical focal point for develop-
mental efforts. Tribes not currently incorporated should face no 
insuperable difficulties in organizing since several of these unin-
corporated tribes are already organized around a tribal constitution.168 
While incorporation under the IRA may not be available for these 
tribes, 169 they may be able to incorporate under state law if they have 
not already done so. 
Of even greater importance for future advancement is the corpo-
rate form's potential as a developmental tool for nonreservation 
Indians. Urban Indian groups, of course, cannot incorporate under 
the IRA.170 Yet, the corporate form can also be utilized by these 
groups. The bulk of this discussion has dealt only with organized 
tribes, which today, for the most part, means reservation Indians. 
from the President on the American Indians, 116 CONG, R.Ec. 23131 (1970). Nevertheless, 
not all Indian fears have been allayed. See Statement of the Indian Members of the 
National Council on Indian Opportunity to the Chairman and Federal Members, in 3 
AM. INDIAN L. NEWSLEITER 50, 51 (1970). 
163. Statement of the Indian Members of the National Council on Indian oppor-
tunity, supra note 162, at 59. 
164. See United States v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 432 (1903): Makah Indian Tribe v. Clallam 
County, 73 Wash. 2d 677, 440 P.2d 442 (1968). 
165. Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Grune, 391 U.S. 392 (1968); People V, 
Jondreau, 384 Mich. 539, 185 N.W.2d 375 (1971). 
166. Fretz, The Bill of Rights and American Indian Tribal Governments, 6 NATURAL 
RESOURCES J. 581, 588 (1966). 
167. See text accompanying notes 119-20 supra. 
168. See note 122 supra and accompanying text. 
169. See note 65 supra and accompanying text. 
170. See 25 U.S.C. § 479 (1970). 
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But perhaps half of the Indian population in the United States is 
neither on reservations nor within any officially recognized group or 
tribe.171 Most nonreservation Indians live in large cities, often in 
ghetto areas, although a few groups remain in small communities on 
the East Coast.172 Urban Indians are too often ignored in studies.173 
Problems of cultural identity and economic misfortune are not 
easily left behind on the reservation. Indeed, there is much evidence 
to the effect that these problems often become worse upon moving 
from the reservation to the city.174 The ideas presented here should 
be adaptable to nonreservation Indian groups seeking to advance 
economically and simultaneously to retain their "Indianness." 
It would be tempting to try to prescribe some broad economic plan 
for Indian development using the IRA as a spring board. Such a 
venture would be a foolhardy, if not an impossible, task. There are 
more than 500 individual tribes, Native villages,175 and other recog-
nized Indian communities or units in the United States today, as well 
as numerous urban and local Indian groups.176 This number itself 
s1,1ggests the unlikelihood of any one scheme fitting the needs of all 
these groups and individuals. The problem is further complicated by 
the profound differences that exist among various Indian cultures and 
subgroups. For example, reservations range in size from the one-acre 
Strawberry Valley Rancheria in Yuba County, California, to the 15 
million-acre Navajo reservation that extends into three states.177 The 
historical experiences among tribes have been even more varied, 
ranging from the wealth-conscious tribes of the Pacific Northwest178 
171. BROPHY CoMMISSION, supra note 18, Tables 1 & 2, at 215-18. The figures for 
1960 show a total of 523,591 Indians. Of these, 344,951 are within or adjacent to "units," 
i.e., those for whom the Bureau of Indian Affairs provides some direct services. The 
many qualifications placed on available figures make precise calculations of percentages 
"on" or "off" reservations impossible. The Census Bureau's definition of "Indian" 
further compounds the matter. See id. at 215. It is unlikely 'that an accurate count 
could ever be made. 
172, Id. at 11. 
173. For example, the Brophy Commission expressly limits its primary concern to 
"members of tribes, bands, and communities so recognized by the United States." Id. 
at 11. 
174. See, e.g., V. DELORIA, supra note 144, at 243-57; Gabourie, Justice and the Urban 
American Indian, 46 CAI.IF. ST. B.J. 36 (1971). 
175. The term "Native" here refers to Alaska Natives, i.e., all aboriginal peoples 
of the Alaska territory. 
176. A. JoSEPHY, supra note 9, at 359, lists 284 separate Indian land units and 35 
groups of other types of "public domain" allotments. This is exclusive of Alaska 
Native villages. The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 92-203, 
§ ll(b)(l), 85 Stat. 697, lists 209 Native villages. 
177. A. JosEPHY, supra note 9, at 360. 
178. Id. at 72-78; P. DRUCKER, INDIANS OF THE NORTHWFST COAST (Am. Museum Sci. 
Books ed. 1963). 
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to the impoverished bands of the Great Basin;170 from the deeply 
religious and peace-loving Pueblos of the Southwest188 to the powerful 
Iroquois League of the East.181 
Furthermore, the needs of tribal groups vary significantly because 
of differing legal and administrative experience. The legislative acts 
discussed above are mainly of the type applying broadly to all 
Indians. These, however, represent only a small fraction of Indian 
legal history. There are literally thousands of statutes, treaties, 
opinions of the Solicitor or Attorney General, and judicial decisions 
relating to Indians.182 The ovenvhelming majority of these apply 
to only one tribe or only one group of tribes.183 Thus, even aside from 
the vast cultural divergence, there are wide variances in the levels 
from which future economic and legal development must begin. 
No single model can be proposed for Indian development. Instead 
the developmental schemes must be related to specific groups. Ideally, 
the architects of these schemes will come from within the tribes or 
groups themselves. Only in this manner can the concepts of self-
government and self-determination envisioned by the IRA become a 
reality. Consequently, this discussion will be limited to consideration 
of a legal form on which to build. The specific examples cited are 
simply meant to illustrate possible extensions of these legal ideas. 
The corporate form of organization lends itself to use in tribal 
development, since it is "tribal" in its very nature. Incorporation 
creates a recognizable legal entity around which to focus community 
goals, be they making money or providing services to members. 
Moreover, these goals are more easily effected by the use of the 
corporate form. Prior discussion has emphasized the unique flexi-
bility of the IRA.184 This feature should be capitalized upon, and 
tribes originally voting against application of the Act should be 
permitted to reconsider. Moreover, forceful removal of much ad-
ministrative discretionary power may be necessary to allow proper 
development.185 
179. A. JosEPHY, supra note 9, at 123-29, 
180. Id. at 146-80. See also C. Kr.UCKHOHN 8.: D. LEIGHTON, THE NAVAHO (Natural 
History Library rev. ed. 1962); F. WATERS, BooK OF THE HOPI (Ballantine Walden ed. 
1969). 
181. See authorities cited in note 99 supra. 
182. In 1940, "more than 4,000" had been counted. Ickes (Secretary of Interior in 
the Roosevelt Administration), Foreword to F. CoHEN, supra note 2, at xix. Dozens and 
even hundreds more occur each year, a fact revealed simply by scanning through 
various issues of the American Indian Law Newsletter. 
183. See, e.g., authorities cited in note 66 supra. 
184. See text accompanying notes 69-75 supra; text preceding note 150 supra. 
185. See notes 147-48 supra and accompanying text. More than one Indian leader 
has called for a "leave us alone" law. E.g., V. DELORIA, supra note 144, at 33-34. A recent 
enactment in this direction was § 601 of the 1968 Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1331 
(1970), which changed the law concerning tribal employment of legal counsel. Although 
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Suggestions for greater utilization of the corporate form by Indian 
tribes have appeared before. Continuation of tribal corporations, now 
organized under state law, was recommended as the best method for 
disposing of the property of terminated tribes.186 More recently, the 
use of corporations has been a key factor in the Alaska Native Claims 
Settlement Act.187 The use of the corporate form in this Act illustrates 
its current applicability to Indian problems. Few of the Act's objec-
tives could have been accomplished without the use of corporations. 
Two levels of corporate entities are provided for. Section 7 of this 
Act divides the State of Alaska into twelve geographic regions 
based on common heritage and coinciding with certain existing 
Native associations. Each of these is to establish a Regional Corpo-
ration to conduct business for profit, and details of the corporate 
structure are set out. Section 8 requires that the Native villages 
receiving land under the Act incorporate Village Corporations.188 
Both the Regional and the Village Corporations are to be organized 
under state law. Elaborate provisions are also set forth to govern 
distribution of funds and land.189 
The significance of the corporate concept in this Act is reflected 
by section 19, which revokes the existence of all reservations in Alaska. 
Thus there is a transformation from an old to a new way of thinking. 
Chartered corporate business entities rather than the old-style reser-
vations are to assume the control of community life through the 
direct participation of community members. 
Other successful tribal projects include such widely varied efforts 
as the Gila River Reservation Model Cities Program, industrial parks 
in various Arizona reservations, "buy Indian" federal contracting, 
road building and construction in southwestern reservations, the 
manufacture of fishing boats on the Colorado River Reservation, the 
Mescalero Apache ski resort, and experiments in vegetable growing at 
Fort Yuma.190 Many of these successful projects presumably stem in 
part from the tribes' existence as corporate entities chartered under 
the IRA. 
One example deserves special mention as a model of harmonious 
co-existence between a modern economic enterprise and the tradi-
tional cultural and value systems. On the Yankton Sioux Reservation 
government approval for such employment is still required, it is now deemed to have 
been given unless specifically denied within ninety days. This enactment changes the 
original position of § 16 of the IRA, 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1970). 
186, Termination Hearings, supra note 159, at 242. 
187. Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688. 
188. The Act itself, at § ll(b)(l), lists 206 separate villages subject to the Act, with 
provision for additions. 
189. Pub. L. No. 92-203, §§ 6, 9, 11-12, 14, 85 Stat. 690, 694, 696, 701-02. 
190. See 117 CONG. REc. S. 5459-60 (daily ed. April 22, 1971) (speech by Sen. Paul 
Fannin at Arizona Town Hall, April 18, 1971). 
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in South Dakota, there is a factory that manufactures electronic 
components.191 The work routine of this factory is highly unusual. 
Each employee sets his own work schedule. He works as long as he 
wants, when he wants. At the end of the month he is paid for the 
amount of work that he has done. There are no white man's efficiency 
experts. Despite its uniqueness, the enterprise has worked. Not only 
have the tribal members retained their cultural identity in the 
presence of this modern facility, but the factory's work has been 
highly respected by midwestern electronics firms subcontracting with 
it. Recently there has even been an expansion to enable the Santee 
Sioux across the river in Nebraska to participate. The dilemma posed 
by the desire to retain cultural identity and at the same time to en-
joy economic advancement apparently has been resolved here through 
use of the corporate form. 
Other techniques using corporate organization are possible. An 
experiment now being tested on the Salt River Reservation in South-
ern Arizona involves contracting between the state or local govern-
ments of Arizona and a tribe.192 The tribe provides services for its 
members, using funds from the Office of Economic Opportunity and 
other sources. It also contracts with the State of Arizona for such 
services as water and sewerage. This experiment appears to have been 
working well. It should be noted that the tribe involved is the 
Papago, one to which a long history of special legal rules apply.193 
Nonetheless, it would seem that other tribes incorporated under 
the IRA or state law are ideal for this kind of experimentation. 
Another striking example of the use of modern business tech-
niques in tribal enterprise is that of the Jicarilla Apache tribe in New 
Mexico. The once powerful Apache entered the twentieth century 
as a lethargic, defeated people. Yet "in the past generation the 
Apaches have transformed themselves [into] a modern cooperative 
commonwealth, which has prospered by dealing in oil, gas and 
timber leases, sheep and cattle."194 This transformation has come 
about through use of their corporate status under the IRA and ap-
plication of modern business techniques. 
The development began with a small loan of $85,000 from the 
federal government.195 In part, this money was used to acquire 
land. Individuals also reconveyed landholdings to the tribe, further 
191. A more complete account appears in S. STEINER, supra note 161, 124-26. 
192. See V. DELORIA, supra note 144, at 141-42. The project is authorized by 25 U.S.C. 
§ 416 (1970). 
193. The IRA itself reflects some of the Papagos' special status. In the Act and 
amendments there are special provisions affecting only the Papago Tribe. See § 3 of the 
IRA, as amended, 25 U.S.C. §§ 463 to 463c (1970). See also 1934 Senate Hearings, supra 
note 54, at 33-51. 
194. N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1972, § 6 (Magazine), at 18. 
195. Id. at 41. 
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strengthening the land base. From this, holdings in sheep and cattle 
were expanded, leading to the marketing of beef and wool. Oil and 
gas deposits were discovered and exploited, along with timber, 
through leasing arrangements. Tourism was promoted through the 
selling of hunting and fishing licenses. The tribe even financed a 
motion picture.196 
Tribal wealth has increased markedly. Between 8 million dollars 
and 12 million dollars has been invested by the tribal corporation and 
is producing income.197 Another 8 million dollars is due from the 
federal government in settlement of old land claims. The tribe 
operates a I million dollar scholarship fund. In 1971, approximately 
$100,000 was received through hunting and fishing alone. The tribal 
land itself, of course, is not valued, but it produces revenue through 
the previously mentioned leases. The tribe also operates a small 
factory, the Jicarilla Apache Tribe Industries. 
The guiding principle throughout this development is modern 
business techniques, adapted to the tribal form. The tribal council 
performs the major planning functions, assisted in part by an 
Albuquerque bank. It should be noted that despite the tribal develop-
ment, the individual members are by no means rich. Individual 
family income averages $4,000.198 This is supplemented somewhat by 
freedom from such things as state property taxes and by availability 
of such services as medical and dental care and some subsidized 
housing. But the prospects for the future are bright. The relative 
desolation a generation earlier emphasizes the tribe's economic 
growth and convincingly demonstrates the potential of tribal de-
velopment based on modern business techniques.199 
One writer has suggested that corporations may be a vehicle by 
which urban Indian groups may gain economic development and 
retain cultural identity.200 Some urban Indian centers are already 
incorporated as nonprofit organizations.201 The next step is to com-
bine the resources of tribal corporations under the IRA and the urban 
centers, forming corporations "for developmental purposes in which 
both reservation and non-reservation people participate . . .. to ex-
196. Id. at 19. 
197. Id. at 46. 
198. Id. 
199. For other modern tribal uses of the corporate form, see 116 CoNG. R.Ec. E 10448 
(daily ed. Dec. 15, 1970), containing an account of a tribal supermarket operated by 
Blood Indians of Southern Alberta, developed with the help of Safeway Stores; Wall St. 
J., April 12, 1971, at 20, col. 1, describing the Tyonek Management Corporation of 
Alaska's Tyonek Indians, who used funds received from leases to the Humble Oil 
Company for construction of modem houses, a school, street paving, and a power plant. 
In both these instances, the people were able to retain their cultural identity while 
developing economically. 
200. V. DELORIA, supra note 144, at 258-59. 
201. See NATIVE AMERICAN LAW MANUAL 162 (M. Price ed. 1970). 
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plore ideas of development outside either reservation boundaries or 
urban centers."202 It is suggested that 
[w]here ordinary white corporations serve to produce income from 
capital invested, corporations ... [under] the new Indian scheme 
.... ·will serve to coordinate community life. Earnings will be used 
to provide services ordinarily received from various governmental 
agencies. As economic independence becomes greater, independence 
in other areas of life will follow. Indians can thereby achieve a pros-
perity not seen since the landing of the white man.203 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The parallel benveen tribalism and incorporation has been sug-
gested.204 It is not unreasonable to suggest therefore that the Indians• 
long history of tribalism as a way of life makes corporate organization 
a particularly appropriate means of modern Indian development. 
The experiences discussed above show that the corporate form is 
indeed amenable to Indian ways of business operation. It is also 
very possible that continued use of corporate organization will facili-
tate a greater cross-cultural understanding in our society.200 Tribes 
and other Indian groups can thus absorb the corporation, whether 
chartered under the IRA or state law, as a useful tool for accomplish-
ment of the desired ends. 
We shall learn all these devices the White Man has. 
We shall handle his tools for ourselves. 
We shall master his machinery, his inventions, 
his skills, his medicine, 
his planning; 
But we'll retain our beauty 
And still be Indian.2os 
202. V. DELORIA, supra note 144, at 259. 
203. Id. 
204. See text preceding note 184 supra. 
205. "In the corporate structure, formal and informal, Indian tribalism has its 
greatest parallels and it is through this means that Indians believe that modem society 
and Indian tribes will finally reach a cultural truce." V. DELORIA, supra note 144, at 
224-25. 
206. Poem by David Martin Nez, in S. STEINER, supra note 161. at 131. 
